The Analytic/Continental divide has driven philosophy for decades, embodying separate views on almost all fields in the discipline. English-speaking philosophers, and some Germans, essentially gained a philosophical hegemony in the English-speaking countries of the world, influencing the course of such thought in those nations. The Continentals were essentially French and German thinkers who gained a similar hegemony of thought.[[1]](#footnote-1) Though several Continental philosophers, most notably Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, gained significant influence in American academia, they did not attain any significant influence in American philosophy departments; as a result, and as a means of narrowing the focus of this paper, only the philosophy branch of academia will be considered.

This divide became glaring during the second half of the 20th century, more specifically after the events of World War II (WWII). Therefore, the question arises: What were the philosophical reasons for such a divide, and did WWII have an historical upon it? The philosophical reasons for such a divide date back a few centuries, and manifest themselves in the meta-philosophical views of the partisans of the divide, while the historical impact of WWII geographically cut off both sides from each other.

What will follow will be a case study and contrast between Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger, since both their philosophical leanings (Carnap the Analytic, Heidegger the Continental), and their lives, exemplify both the historical and philosophical aspects of the divide at the time. History and philosophy will be used to illuminate the contexts they found themselves in. The historical will be examined first, dealing first with academic changes due to the Nazis, along with the political changes in neighbouring Austria. Then the philosophical nature of the divide will be discussed, with Rebecca Goldstein’s *Plato at The Googleplex* used to justify the nature of how the philosophical side is approached in the paper. While the divide itself may be problematic at times, it still functions well when dealing with broader trends of thought. Despite this, the division will be treated in its broadest sense as a means of separating two different, but difficult to concretely identify, traditions.

Prior to the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, the academic scene in Weimar Germany had not been particularly different from other European countries at the time. Academics in the Weimar Republic had access to virtually total academic freedom.[[2]](#footnote-2) However, once the Nazis took power in 1933, the educational climate in Germany changed radically. Hitler himself actually held professors and even higher education as a whole in contempt; he wanted to shift the end-goal of education from the universities and the academic scene to labour service and military conscription instead.[[3]](#footnote-3) The role of education was no longer to educate, but instead to further the cause of the national state, which had now gained control over all educational institutions. They were all under the direct control of the Reich Minister of Education. Heidegger was actually elected rector of Freiburg University in 1933, and a month later joined the Nazi party. Even the role of teachers was changed; far from simply being educators, teachers were now considered to be “the executors of the will of the party-supported State.”[[4]](#footnote-4) All educators from kindergarten to university were forced to join the National Socialist Teacher’s League or face being fired. The university level was especially affected: all new candidates for teaching positions had to attend a six week long camp where they were evaluated by Nazi experts, who sent their findings to the Reich Ministry of Education. The Ministry would then issue licenses allowing one to teach, as determined by the candidate’s “political reliability.”[[5]](#footnote-5)

The effect of such stringent control upon academia in Germany was extreme. The Nazi politics of racial identity influenced all fields of German education during this period.[[6]](#footnote-6) German academics began to speak of “German physics” and “German math”. The idea was that methods of acquiring knowledge, primarily science, were not in fact objective but coloured by the blood and race of its practitioner. Therefore, “Aryan science” was the only true science. A program of re-interpretation and re-writing of textbooks began in the history of science, where all the greats of science were determined to have been “Aryan”, such Galileo Galilei and Sir Isaac Newton.[[7]](#footnote-7) Due to this totalitarian control, many big names in the German scientific establishment, such as Einstein, either left, were fired, or retired. Einstein himself was actually accused of being behind a world-wide Jewish plot to infiltrate and weaken science, and as a result destroy civilization. Needless to say this also was considered an attack on allegedly superior German science.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Philosophy was no exception to the control exerted by the Nazis. Nazi ideology held a symbolic role in the universities: in order for one’s work to be approved by the Nazis, it was not complete consistency with Nazi ideology that was required, but a clear willingness to adopt the principles of the party as a part of one’s work.[[9]](#footnote-9) This meant that one could do philosophy or science, but only so long as the work was compatible with the Nazi worldview. Some philosophers in Germany at the time, such as Ernst Krieck went so far as to argue that Nazi ideology had ended Enlightenment universalism and replaced it with “the principle of race and Volk.”[[10]](#footnote-10) Many strains of philosophy managed to stay in Germany: neo-Kantianism, existentialism, and phenomenology remained present in universities at the time.

Despite this, philosophy did not hold a strong position in the Nazi regime. Heidegger had hoped that due to his high profile, he would be able to elevate philosophy from irrelevancy to a guiding force in Nazism. He hoped to replace what he felt was the crude racial politics in the propaganda flyers with a more rigorous and philosophical foundation. He even hoped he would be able to get philosophy to be what helped achieve the Nazi “new man.”[[11]](#footnote-11) He ended up completely failing; this was mostly due to his decline of popularity amongst Nazis during the mid-thirties. Unlike what he claimed post-war, this decline had absolutely nothing to do with any kind of dissent with Nazi politics. He simply assumed he was of a higher profile and more influential than he really was. His attempts to influence party policy in a totalitarian regime were not met with a warm welcome.[[12]](#footnote-12) In essence, there were two ideological conditions which a philosopher had to fulfill to be able to remain and continue their work: the first was that Nazi politics or views were not called into question. The second was that they were not Marxist or Logical Positivist, since those positions were explicitly banned.[[13]](#footnote-13) Marxism, because politically it was diametrically opposed to Nazism; Logical Positivism, because a logical positivist believes in the objectivity of science. Unfortunately, Rudolf Carnap was both of those; Martin Heidegger was neither.

The recent publications of Heidegger’s black notebooks, highly detailed notebooks he kept between 1931 and the early 1970’s, can shed light upon the relationship here between politics and philosophy. Heidegger, bluntly put, used his philosophy as a means of justifying his anti-Semitism and pro-Nazi views. He was fond of the concrete in philosophy, like the *Dasein*, as opposed to the abstract; and in Nazism he found what he considered to be a very concretely minded worldview.[[14]](#footnote-14) He is of the opinion that “the ascendency of the Jews belonged to ‘the metaphysics of the West’ that helped spread ‘empty rationality’”, several concepts which he abhorred.[[15]](#footnote-15) Carnap, on the other hand, was far more comfortable with the abstract and theoretical, due to his Logical Positivism, and would have taken great issue with the lack theoretical framework for Nazism. It can be seen here that the politics at play can be linked to leanings of a more philosophical nature.

The situation in Austria for Rudolf Carnap was bleak. Ever since 1931, when the German-Austrian credit union was renounced, power struggles between Italy, Germany, and other European nations for control over Austria had been ongoing. Mussolini wished to create an Italy-Hungary-Austria economic and political triangle, while Hitler wished to reunite Austria with Germany.[[16]](#footnote-16) There were also a number of Austrian fascist movements which allied themselves with fascist powers such as Italy and Germany. The *Heimwehr* was one such organisation, used by the Italians in an attempt to gain more support in Austria. Austria had its own National Socialist party, which had ties to Hitler. Englebert Dolfuss was the head of government, and in 1933 he dissolved parliament which led to Austria being under a semi-dictatorial rule. He chose to ally himself with the *Heimwehr*, and began to establish a fascist state. In May of 1933 he established the fascist Fatherland Front. This was the moment when Austria became a fascist state, though it would take some time for Hitler to intervene, chase away Italian influence and finally in 1938, begin the *Anschluss*, the annexation of Austria by Germany.[[17]](#footnote-17) Though Carnap had left by 1935, it was clear that before then Austria had become hostile to him. An avowed socialist, he had been politically active, and so when Austria became fascist, a dangerous situation appeared. As a result, he left Austria for the United States in 1935, to escape the “stifling”[[18]](#footnote-18) political and cultural atmosphere in Europe, and the danger of war erupting.

Only the historical has been touched upon up to this point; why thinkers like Carnap ended up in one area of the world, and those like Heidegger another. Their influence on their respective traditions, providing justification for this split, will be touched upon later. For now, a brief discussion on the merits of viewing philosophy through history is required before proceeding. As Goldstein argues in *Plato at the Googleplex*, one cannot view philosophy as an atemporal discipline. There is an essential distinction one must make between the *context of discovery* and the *context of justification*.[[19]](#footnote-19) The former is the notion that a philosopher or scientist will ask a certain question, or have a certain presupposition, because of their historical or social context. The latter is that idea that one can evaluate how sound or valid the justification for their beliefs is without having to have recourse to the social or historical context. This does not undermine the importance or the intelligence of the thinkers in question. In reality, it merely frames their projects in a way which allows them to be treated in the most accurate fashion possible. Just because a philosopher was influenced by their circumstance, does not mean they were completely determined by it. One can still appreciate what the philosopher achieved in the context of discovery, without it diminishing their argument in the context of justification.

Considerations of the context of discovery can be instrumental in treating the context of justification.[[20]](#footnote-20) It can serve to “flush out unstated premises in an argument”, certain ideas which were considered intuitive to the thinker.[[21]](#footnote-21) The following exposition on the philosophical beliefs of Heidegger and Carnap, will not be attempts to justify what they thought as true or false, sound or not. Instead, it will be an attempt to demonstrate exactly how they are both emblematic of the traditions they come from. Therefore, after their ideas are explained, it will be the ideological context of discovery which will be examined. One would not be able to understand how they fall into either philosophical tradition, without first knowing what their philosophy actually was.

The central question which fuels Heidegger’s philosophy is the question of being. This may initially seem like a strange pre-occupation to have, considering he expresses clearly anti-metaphysical views. He engages in a critical approach to the history of philosophy, and feels that traditional metaphysics had been “a history of fictions constructed to avoid the truth of being”.[[22]](#footnote-22) While it is true that Heidegger feels Western metaphysics from Descartes onwards had been subjective to an almost nihilistic degree, he does not feel that metaphysics itself is a fruitless endeavour.[[23]](#footnote-23) He simply believes that metaphysics in Western philosophy had been focused on the wrong questions and has missed several essential aspects of being.

Heidegger deals with the question of Being by beginning with his notion of the *Dasein*. This is a combination of the German words for ‘there’ and ‘being’, *da* and *sein*; literally translated as “being-there”. The term is meant to connote a concrete “being-in-world”, a living human being as it seems. *Dasein* precisely connotes a human as it seems, as opposed to as it is, because Heidegger was a proponent of phenomenology, which is the study of what appears to a conscious being, the phenomena.[[24]](#footnote-24) He engages in an “existential analytic” to better understand phenomenology, because he feels that the only subject who can question Being in general is a being who questions its own existence, and is self-conscious.[[25]](#footnote-25) *Dasein* also does not refer to simply any subject, but specifically the human being. Heidegger feels that there are fundamental differences between a human and the mode of Being of all other things. These differences can be best understood through his reaction to traditional western metaphysics.

Traditional Western metaphysics defines human beings using terms it would define other beings with as well, as beings with properties than can be objectively described; in short, as a subject. An example of this is the concept of ‘substance’, which can be applied to humans and material objects alike. Heidegger diverges from the western tradition by claiming that *Dasein*’s essence is precisely its existence; the characteristics one can use to describe this existence are not properties which are present, but the many possible ways *Dasein* could be. Due to this fact, he claims that *Dasein* has no properties of that kind, because it does not exist as “simply present” and “available for categorical dissection”, and so it cannot be pinned down under metaphysical labels which are exactly those two things. [[26]](#footnote-26) When one designates *Dasein*, one describes “not its *what*, but its Being.”[[27]](#footnote-27) This means that *Dasein* is a term which does not separate the subject from their spatio-temporal situation, but it embraces it. One cannot philosophize about being and not take into account the spatio-temporal situation that *Dasein* finds itself in.

This ontological starting point of being heavily influences his epistemological views. To understand Heidegger, one must understand the consequences of the ‘there’ half of *Dasein* as well. He argues that there is an interpretive nature to experience: one can never see objective reality (which he does believe exists) as it is, due to the fact that everything is mediated by history, which is the spatio-temporal aspect previously touched upon. This historicism places the ‘here’ and the ‘now’ of the interpreter and the ‘there and then’ of the interpreted at the center of understanding.[[28]](#footnote-28) The second branch of the interpretive nature of experience is the prejudgements made by the *Dasein*; in essence it is the unquestioning following of an already accepted framework of being by the *Dasein*, with said framework being one of many possible ones to be chosen. This leads him to believe that reason as understood by western philosophy was a bankrupt notion: it was subjective and broken, since it was the tool of something outside of rationality. It is driven by “anxiety in the face of nothing”, by a “primordial angst-driven flight from death”.[[29]](#footnote-29) If one was to agree with Heidegger, this would result in a devaluation of the importance of propositional truth, such as the kind in logic, and argumentative or discursive thought.[[30]](#footnote-30) Combined, these answers to the questions of being and knowledge lead Heidegger to abandon the traditional project of philosophy.

This non-traditional philosophical approach has had a profound influence on the major figures of 20th century Continental philosophy. Prime among those who carry the Heideggerian project further is Jacques Derrida, a French post-structuralist philosopher and one of the major figures of deconstructionism. He hoped to carry on Heidegger’s critique of reason via the route of first taking down traditional western metaphysics. He takes Heidegger’s concept of “language (…) as the house of being”, which is essentially the idea that language frames everything including being, and he begins his philosophical project from there.[[31]](#footnote-31) Another French figure who was inspired by Heidegger was Michel Foucault, once again a post-structuralist philosopher. He is known for historicizing the validity of truth, by claiming that the conditions which make something true or false themselves can neither be true nor false.[[32]](#footnote-32) This notion of historicized truth is directly inspired by Heidegger’s doctrine of historicized being and interpretation of the world. Both thinkers were inspired by Heidegger and can be seen to further the notion that Heidegger was a foundational figure in post-WWII Continental philosophy.

On the other side of the philosophical divide was Rudolf Carnap. While they both may have been anti-metaphysicians to an extent, the way they go about being so is fundamentally different in tone and goal. Carnap views metaphysics as a field which in its attempt to acquire “knowledge of the essence of things”, transcends what the empirical, inductive sciences can say about the world.[[33]](#footnote-33) He feels that the post-Kantian systems of German philosophy, known as German Idealism, does exactly this. Furthermore, due to this overstepping of the limits of knowledge, Carnap believes all that metaphysics can express is a vague life-feeling, and not anything substantial or fit for philosophical discourse.[[34]](#footnote-34) This kind of metaphysical approach is characteristic of Bergson and Heidegger in Carnap’s eyes. Once again, like Heidegger, his views on metaphysics are more nuanced than often portrayed: he did not feel that all of traditional western metaphysics was meaningless. He respected Kant and Aristotle due to the fact they did not attempt to transcend the limits of the empirical sciences.[[35]](#footnote-35)

Unlike Heidegger, though, Carnap does not attempt to salvage metaphysics in any form. Rather his project is to get around metaphysical disputes entirely as they often impede progress in answering questions that he feels philosophy ought to answer. Carnap attempts to replace metaphysics with a pragmatic, planned logical language whose goal is to be a philosophical support for empirical sciences to clarify and further them.[[36]](#footnote-36) The planned language would overcome the deficiencies of natural languages, and provide the universality required to engage in scientific activity. The way this would be achieved would be by incorporating the “underlying logical forms responsible for the objectivity of natural scientific knowledge” in the language itself, thereby empowering it to serve scientific needs.[[37]](#footnote-37) Such an undertaking was called by Carnap *Wissenchaftlogik*, or the logic of science. The aim of a logician of science would be to get science and philosophy to overcome these metaphysical quandaries not by solving them, but by finding a structure of explanation (created by the aforementioned logic-based language) for empirical theories which would be able to classify these questions as irrelevant.[[38]](#footnote-38)

This focus on logic heavily informs Carnap’s epistemological views. He feels that the new mathematical logic developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, along with developments in mathematics itself, both play an important “formal or inferential” role in empirical knowledge.[[39]](#footnote-39) The ensuring system created by Carnap to fulfill this goal was a “constitutional” system; in short, the definition of concepts in science are made up of varying levels of logical constructions, whose basis lies in the “elementary experiences” of the person having them.[[40]](#footnote-40) Terms in logic and mathematics do not have any content, meaning they are purely formal; their content is essentially the descriptive terms provided by elementary experiences. These experiences must be inherently subjective but this poses no problem for Carnap. He posits a “Principle of Toleration”: there is no correct answer to the question of epistemological foundationalism, the doctrine which says that there must be a basis to all of knowledge which is not inferred.[[41]](#footnote-41) As a result, there is no absolutely correct formulation of either logic or math. Epistemology can have several starting points, and all these possible starting points are “neutral bases”, from which logic provides the structure to parse out the incorrect metaphysical judgements. This is no endorsement of relativism, though. It is still thoroughly pragmatic, for the right starting point in the eyes of Carnap is that which best serves the “formal deductive needs of empirical science.”[[42]](#footnote-42) However, his system is also not an endorsement of epistemological foundationalism. It is concerned with only the formal aspect of knowledge, not the content which serves to justify any instance of knowledge. In essence, his project is an empirical view of the Kantian notion that the mind structures the world in order to understand it, but he believes logic to be that structure.

Carnap’s influence on later Analytic philosophy is often understated, very much due to the fact he is often caricatured. As the main face of Logical Positivism, his views influenced subsequent logical positivists such as A.J. Ayer, who claims to have taken up his philosophical project. Notwithstanding the fact that Ayer misreads Carnap and contributes to his caricaturization, he is greatly influenced by Carnap’s focus on logic, math, and the elimination of metaphysics. Carnap’s most celebrated student is W.V.O. Quine, who in 1951 wrote *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, which demolished the logical positivist stance and influenced much of 20th century epistemology. While Carnap’s views were actually more in line with Quine than most have believed, his influence in Analytic philosophy, even as a force to react against as opposed to build on, is instrumental.[[43]](#footnote-43) Quine himself even referred to American philosophy after WWII as “Post-Carnapian.” [[44]](#footnote-44)

From this exposition of their philosophies, several juxtapositions can be drawn which speak to the philosophical divide at the time. The usage of language is the most obvious: while Carnap prefers a style which aims at clarity and literal interpretation, Heidegger aims to use language in a new way. Heidegger believed that language shaped thought, and so if he was to tear down and rebuild metaphysics, the old language used to discuss it had to be abandoned.[[45]](#footnote-45) This leads him to say things such as the infamous “Nothing itself nothings”.[[46]](#footnote-46) Carnap took issue with this because Heidegger was using ‘nothing’ as both a substantive and a verb, of which it is neither.[[47]](#footnote-47) Heidegger has been defended by bringing up the aforementioned point that he intentionally uses language in a new way, and one commenter even said that “No serious student of Heidegger bothers with such critiques; too painfully do they miss the point.”[[48]](#footnote-48) This, however, does not do justice to Carnap; no serious student of Carnap would take such a retort seriously, because Carnap understood what Heidegger was doing. The point that Carnap was aiming for is that Heidegger denies the centrality of logic and science in philosophy, replacing it instead with ontology, the study of Being.[[49]](#footnote-49) Heidegger outright dismisses the developments in math and mathematical physics, claiming they have no philosophical importance, since they do not deal with Being. Carnap is of the opposite opinion, in that these developments and developments in related fields, are of the utmost philosophical importance.

Such disagreements point to a larger, more fundamental issue: their views on the role of philosophy. Heidegger believed that the role of philosophy, since it should focus on the *Dasein*, is an emancipatory role. Philosophy is supposed to help in “the self-freeing of the freedom in human beings”, an essentially personal endeavour.[[50]](#footnote-50) Carnap, however, viewed philosophy to be primarily concerned with epistemology, and that as such it should be a branch of mathematical science, the aforementioned *Wissenchaftlogik*. Carnap’s intent was to hold onto formal logic and the aim of universality, which would end up putting a great importance on the sciences; Heidegger’s intent was to completely divorce oneself from ‘logic and exact thinking generally.” Since he felt they were bankrupt it would be misleading to focus on them. As a result, he completely rejects any attempt to a purely universal validity beyond the realm of the human being.[[51]](#footnote-51)

These disagreements and juxtapositions culminate in the meta-philosophical cultures they each are a part of. In this light, WWII provided the geo-political force to wedge the actual believers in the two cultures apart, creating what is now seen as the Analytic/Continental divide. WWII was not, however, the whole story; it merely provided a (historical) divide between two opposing meta-philosophical views. These views begun to diverge in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, as a result of opposing reactions in England to Kant’s Idealism and the Romantic Movement.[[52]](#footnote-52) The first can only be described as the “empirical-scientific” view (what became Analytic); a proponent of this view uses logical and empirical tools to analyze any idea or concept.[[53]](#footnote-53) Carnap is prototypical of such a view, due to the fact he proceeds in his philosophical project by exactly such methods. It is an attempt to assess the validity and soundness (two core concepts of mathematical logic) of a philosophical system, concept, or even statement. The opposing view is best called “hermeneutic-romantic” (what became Continental), because at its core it is concerned with meaning. Not meaning, though, in the colloquial sense, but in a “contextualist” sense: if one is to understand the meaning of a text or a social practice, one must reconstruct how it emerged historically and what its place was in the social and political reality of its time, along with how it factors into the social and political reality now.[[54]](#footnote-54) Heidegger is emblematic of such an approach to philosophy, seeing as he believes in a metaphysically historicized *Dasein*.

Therefore, the root of the divide is twofold. The Nazi policies of WWII and the fascist tendencies of other countries such as Austria chased away many figures who leaned towards being Analytic in their worldview. The individual cases of Heidegger and Carnap are politically motivated, to an extent. Carnap was in agreement with other Vienna circle members that ‘metaphysicians’ such as Heidegger, are enemies of the proletariat, since they embody a typically bourgeois philosophy.[[55]](#footnote-55) World War II, therefore, contributed to the physical divide of the two schools of thought. The origins of the separate worldviews go back hundreds of years, but it is WWII that turned the divide into an English speaking vs. Other cultural divide; prior to that, it was merely an ideological divide, with Germans and Englishmen on either side of it.[[56]](#footnote-56)

In short, WWII created the necessary conditions to render the divide as parochial and deep as it became; it did not, however, create the divide. The divide as a meta-philosophical worldview is intertwined with the history of thought after Kant, and with English culture. As touched upon earlier, the notion of empirical-scientific vs. hermeneutic-romantic was a result of a divide present in English culture in the late 18th and early 19th century. There was a perceived split between those who sided with German idealism, and those who sided with the empiricists. The empirical side was shared by figures in Germany and Austria, but once the Nazis took power in 1933 they quickly either fled or were killed. This split was then appropriated by other English speaking countries, which laid the foundation for the antagonisms in the 20th century between the two under the monikers Analytic and Continental. In essence, why one falls on one side or the other of the divide on a purely philosophical and theoretical level is based on one’s meta-philosophical beliefs; who it is falling on one side or the other, appears to be a function of where one called home at the end of WWII.

1. “Continental” philosophy can be broken down into several different sub-groups, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p.249. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *Ibid*, p.248. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Ibid,* p.249. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Ibid*, p.249. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Anson Rabinbach and Sander L. Gilman, eds., *The Third Reich Sourcebook* (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2013), p.268. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Shirer, p.250. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *Ibid,* p.250. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Ibid,* p.266. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Rabinbach and Gilman, p.268. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Ibid*, p.269. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Ibid*, p. 267. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *Ibid*, p.268 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Peter E. Gordon, “Heidegger in Black,” *the New York Review of Books* 61, no.15 (2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. *Ibid,* paragraph 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Jürgen Gehl, *Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss: 1931-1938* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.49. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *Ibid*, p.45-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Michael Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (Perus, Illinois: Open Court, 2000), p.14. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Rebecca Goldstein, *Plato at the Googleplex: Why Philosophy Won’t Go Away* (Toronto: Vintage Books, 2014), p.161. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Ibid*, p.161. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Ibid*, p.161. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. S.J. McGrath, *Heidegger: a (very) critical introduction* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans publishing company, 2008), p.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. David Ingram, *Habermas & the Dialectic of Reason* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p.66. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Norman Melchert, *The Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.G-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Ingram, p.87-88. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. McGrath, p.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *Ibid*, p.7. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *Ibid*, p.9. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Ibid*, p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), p.xi. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. *Ibid*, p.163. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *Ibid*, p.255. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Friedman, p.13. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Simon Critchley, *Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.96. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Friedman, p.14. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Michael Friedman and Richard Creath, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Carnap* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.9. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *Ibid*, p.148. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. *Ibid,* p.15. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. *Ibid,* p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. *Ibid*, p.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *Ibid*, p.8. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. *Ibid*, p.8. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Friedman and Creath, p.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Critchley, p.91. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. McGrath, p.3. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Friedman, p.x. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. *Ibid*, p.11. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. McGrath, p.3. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Friedman, p.12. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. *Ibid*, p.151. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. *Ibid*, p.156. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Critchley, p.42. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. *Ibid*, p.43. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. *Ibid*, p.45. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Friedman, p.20. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Critchley, p.32. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)